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Phillips et al. make a compelling case for a reversal in the current paradigm in 
‘Other Minds’ research by considering the representation of other people’s 
knowledge more basic than the attribution of belief. Unfortunately, they only 
discuss primates. In this commentary, I argue that the representation of others’ 
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In their target article “Knowledge before Belief” by Phillips et al. (2020), we are presented with a 
radical reversal of the current paradigm in ‘Other Minds’ research. Breaking with a long tradition 
that sought to understand the minds of other humans (and animals) by focusing on the attribution 
of beliefs, the authors argue that decades of empirical research in the cognitive sciences have 
undermined or at least begun to call into question the assumption that the attribution of knowledge 
rests on a more basic or fundamental capacity to attribute beliefs. For historical, methodological, 
and philosophical reasons, however, other minds research has long been held back from even 
considering this option in the conceptual space. 
 
One way to formulate the underlying problem is to ask which way of representing the minds of 
others came first – the representation of knowledge or of beliefs? By first here I mean something 
stronger than just during the course of human development, i.e. first in the sense of being 
evolutionarily more ancient. Unfortunately, Phillips et al. have little to say about the evolutionary 
history of these traits and, perhaps more worryingly, seem to conflate evolution and development, 
discussing both under the banner of whether the representation of other people’s knowledge 
occurs first or later in human infancy. But the order of appearance of these traits in human 
development may not be the same as in evolutionary history. Ontogeny does not have to track 
phylogeny. By not paying heed to this fallacy, however, evolutionarily problematic conclusions 
straightforwardly follow. If one assumes, for instance, that representation of beliefs come 
developmentally prior in humans, one will only grant representation of others’ knowledge to those 
animals that are also able to also represent the others’ beliefs. But as Phillips et al. themselves 
recognize, the latter ability may turn out to be unique to humans. This would then lead to the 
phylogenetically untenable conclusion that humans are the only creatures on this planet able to 
represent the mental states of others. 
 
Naturally, there are multiple ways out of this dilemma – and the most attractive one will certainly 
be to outright reject the notion that the ability to represent others’ beliefs comes first. Phillips et 
al. accumulate supporting evidence from nonhuman primate species to make the case that the 
human ability to represent beliefs is phylogenetically recent (Marticorena et al., 2011; Martin & 
Santos, 2014, 2016), but I think that they could have dived much deeper into our evolutionary 
history to support their case.  
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Approximately 541 million years, in fact, for this is the beginning of the Cambrian explosion when 
most animal body plans first appeared (Maloof et al. 2010). The ability to track other’s knowledge 
is, I shall argue, an evolutionary ancient trait appearing roughly at the beginning of the Cambrian. 
What is notable in the early Cambrian is an increase in body size and the emergence of various 
sensory modalities to track one’s environment. But more sophisticated ways of sensing one’s 
surrounding naturally led ways of sensing others – to react. This emergence of a richer kind of 
agency gave rise to arms races between predators and prey (Bengtson 2002) and the evolution of 
centralized nervous systems (Wray 2015) to coordinate action and perception. It is during this 
special period that some philosophers and scientists locate the origins of subjectivity and subjective 
experience (Godfrey-Smith 2017; Ginsburg & Jablonka 2019). In research on animal 
consciousness, there is a temptation to look for human indicators – signs of conscious experience 
that are perhaps unique to human life. But such approaches give rise to views that draw firm 
boundaries between us and other animals (Veit & Huebner 2020), a problem that is similarly 
present in research on the origins of other minds’ representation. To switch from the rich 
intentional belief-attribution to the perhaps computationally simpler knowledge-attribution may 
reveal a picture in which the latter is evolutionarily truly ancient. Daniel Dennett’s intentional stance 
program has long emphasized that the ability to attribute beliefs should not be conceived as the 
sudden emergence of a new sophisticated faculty in human, but one that is similarly present in 
other animals (Dennett 1987; Veit et al. 2020). Now, we may have to recognize that it should have 
been the attribution of knowledge to others that deserves our attention here.  
 
An important observation made by Godfrey-Smith (2016) is that there is a transition somewhere 
in the Cambrian after which “the mind evolved in response to other minds” (p. 63). This transition 
should be understood as the evolution of representing other minds’ knowledge. An important 
question for both predator and prey becomes: Have I been seen? The existence of eyes appears to 
function as a shorthand for many animals to make just this inference – when eyes meet, one infers 
knowledge of ones’ location to the subject at the other end of this exchange. Burrowing, ink 
release, and flight are useful attempts to break this link. Many predators avoid the eye contact of 
their prey at all cost. Knowledge and ignorance of one’s surroundings can make all the difference 
to survival. The evolution of eye-spots on butterflies is one spectacular invention to make potential 
predators think that they are seen, thus avoiding conflict. Behaviourists may appeal to simpler 
explanations, but in this case, knowledge attribution may not be such a complex affair. To see 
others in one’s environment as subjects is bound to give one an edge over others in an ecology of 
interaction. But to treat others as subjects entails the attribution of knowledge. 
 
The picture I have offered here is a speculative one – one that ties the explosion of diversity during 
the Cambrian to the recognition of other minds’ knowledge. Nevertheless, it offers additional 
support to the main conclusion in Phillips et al. Focusing on human representations of other minds 
might have biased us against a much more basic approach to other minds research. The attribution 
of knowledge to other minds may be an evolutionarily much more ancient trait than the attribution 
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